A signed “Zscaler” tunnel that tunnels for someone else

About this post: Thanks to MalwareHunterTeam for flagging this new payload. This analysis and write-up were produced by Claude (Opus 5.5), working as an agent in Claude Code on a REMnux analysis VM. Tools used: Malcat, Go toolchain (go version -m, go tool nm), capstone, osslsigncode, a sandboxed Wine setup and ANY.RUN.

TL;DR

ZSATunnel_x86.exe presents itself as the Zscaler Client Connector, the agent many companies use to route staff traffic through Zscaler’s security cloud. It is actually a remote-access backdoor written in Go. It is signed with a valid EV certificate issued to an unrelated Irish company, "MARQUEE AUDIO VISUAL LIMITED". Once running, it takes orders from a server, runs commands, moves files in and out, and can turn the infected PC into a proxy into the victim’s network.

  • Disguise: Zscaler names and version info (11.103.9.6), a legitimate-looking ZSATunnel folder, and a brand-new EV certificate.
  • Remote control: shell commands (cmd or PowerShell), file upload and download, and folder theft as .tar.gz archives.
  • Network pivot: a built-in SOCKS5 tunnel lets the attacker reach other machines through the victim.
  • No address inside: the server address is not in the file. It is read from an environment variable named URSPLUNK and otherwise defaults to localhost.
  • Status: the certificate has been reported to the CA and added to the CertGraveyard.

But it’s signed!

Code signing is a digital seal: it tells Windows who published a program and that nobody changed it afterwards. This file’s seal is valid. The problem is who signed it.

The file details say "Zscaler, Inc." and "Zscaler Client Connector". The signature says "MARQUEE AUDIO VISUAL LIMITED", a company in Dublin. Its Extended Validation (EV) certificate was issued on 23 October 2026 and used to sign this file about three weeks later.

A brand-new certificate that is immediately used to sign someone else’s product is a pattern we see again and again with signed malware. The build timestamp inside the file had also been changed after compilation to a date in 2022, years before the Go version used to build it existed.

How ZSATunnel_x86.exe works: it moves itself into a Zscaler-looking folder, checks in with its server and waits for one of a handful of tasks.
Image: How ZSATunnel_x86.exe works: it moves itself into a Zscaler-looking folder, checks in with its server and waits for one of a handful of tasks.

Where’s the server?

Most backdoors carry their server address inside the file, often encrypted. This one doesn’t. Its built-in default is https://localhost, which points back at the infected computer itself.

The real address comes from an environment variable called URSPLUNK. Think of an environment variable as a sticky note that Windows hands to every program it starts. Whatever launches this backdoor (an installer, a script or an earlier stage) has to write the server address on that note first.

That keeps the signed file free of any server address, which is convenient for the attacker. It also means we don’t know where this copy reports to. We did not have the component that sets the variable.

A quiet worker

On first run, the program moves itself to %LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs\ZSATunnel\ZSATunnel_x86.exe. That spot looks like a normal per-user install of a real Zscaler component. It also opens a hidden window named like a standard Windows text-input window.

It then checks in with its server at an address ending in /v2/alive. To blend in, it identifies itself as axios/1.7.2, a common web-developer library, and sends browser-like headers. Each check-in carries:

  • a random ID for the infected PC, plus a time-stamped signature proving the request comes from a genuine implant;
  • the computer name, user name and local IP address, base64-encoded in a header called X-Metadata.

Between check-ins it sleeps for a random time. Usually that is about a minute to two and a half minutes, and sometimes just 10–13 seconds. It speeds up briefly after receiving work. It gives up after 500 failed check-ins in a row or after 30 days, and on the way out it renames itself to a random .tmp file.

What the attacker can do

Each task from the server is one of a short list:

Task What it does
exec Runs a command through cmd /C or PowerShell. Simple commands (ls, cat, cd, pwd, env, whoami, hostname, localip, tree) are answered by the backdoor itself
push Downloads a file from the server and saves it on the PC
download Uploads a file, folder or wildcard match to the server, packed as .tar.gz and sent in chunks
socks5 Opens a SOCKS5 tunnel through the server, so the attacker can connect onward to anything the PC can reach
sleep Changes how often it checks in
shutdown Exits (and renames itself)

The socks5 task deserves a closer look. SOCKS5 is a standard proxy protocol. Here it lets the attacker point their own tools at, say, an internal file server or admin panel, and the traffic comes out of the victim’s PC as if a colleague had made the connection. For a program dressed as a corporate network-security agent, a tunnel into the corporate network is an awkwardly apt feature.

Hiding in plain sight

The code makes life harder for analysts in a few ways:

  • Every internal function name has been replaced with a random social-media word, such as hashtag, friendUpgrade or genderFlush.
  • Startup code is padded with meaningless arithmetic.
  • Encrypted connections use a library that mimics a web browser’s TLS handshake, so the traffic looks less like a script.

The code also contains a second, switched-off way of talking to its server. When enabled, it wraps every request in an ordinary-looking web form submission sent to a relay. That option is empty in this build, but other builds may use it.

What we couldn’t see

Because the server address is supplied from outside, neither our sandbox runs nor the public sandbox run showed this copy talking to a real server. When we ran it in an isolated environment and gave it a local fake server, it moved itself into place as expected. It never checked in, though, so the network behaviour described above comes from reading the code rather than from watching it. We also don’t know how the file was delivered or what sets URSPLUNK on a victim’s machine.

What should you do?

If you’re a regular user: a Zscaler component is installed by your company’s IT team, never by you from an email, chat message or download link. If you’re asked to run a "Zscaler" file yourself, check with IT first.

If you’re a defender:

  • File location: look for ZSATunnel_x86.exe under %LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs\ZSATunnel\.
  • Environment variable: check for a URSPLUNK variable in user or system settings, and in the environment of running processes.
  • Proxy logs: hunt for requests to /v2/alive, /v2/hook, /v2/submit, /v2/export and /v2/relay with the user agent axios/1.7.2, especially together with Accept-Language: en-NZ,en;q=0.9 and a _session= cookie.
  • Leftovers: a random .tmp file left in the same folder can mark a former infection.
  • Signer: block or alert on this signer and certificate serial.

Indicators of compromise

Type Value
SHA256 fe9829f1c102a79b4ca33c8c8bda8ef2236dc94c6d1de88249c89e82681adc8c
SHA1 eae2226416cdd4b72b68d1408e8a8a1ba1e28819
MD5 1576a17f54c5b149139e6c8f1b2e6b20
Signer MARQUEE AUDIO VISUAL LIMITED (Sectigo Public Code Signing CA EV R36)
Cert serial 00c616578bd978935d9fe5b9751d00ffee
Install path %LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs\ZSATunnel\ZSATunnel_x86.exe
Environment variable URSPLUNK (holds the server address)
URL paths /v2/alive, /v2/hook, /v2/export?id=, /v2/submit, /v2/relay
User-Agent axios/1.7.2
Cookie _session=<16 hex>.<unix time>.<64 hex>

Wrapping up

This one is a good reminder that the name on the box and the name on the seal should match. A valid signature only tells you who signed a file, not that it is what it claims to be. If you’ve seen other copies of this tunnel, especially one that shows where URSPLUNK points, we’d love to hear about it.